

BULLETPROOF.AI



AI vs AI

Intelligent Attacks on Automated Financial Decisions

Martin Rehak, September 2019

"Artificial intelligence won't revolutionize anything if hackers can mess with it."

Dawn Song, UC Berkley, in MIT Technology review




BULLETPROOF.AI

**Security solutions
for AI, machine
learning and
automated
statistical
decisions**

AI Models make critical
business decisions in
split seconds, every
second of the day

**How Secure, Fair and
Robust is your
Machine Learning
System?**

Decision Boundary




- **Facebook effect:** posts on the edge of acceptable use policy get the highest engagement score, regardless of what the actual policy is.
- **Margin impact:** Business next to the decision boundary is less competitive and brings higher margins

Security- Attack Types



Confidentiality Attacks

Attacker may be able to **copy the model** and to **extract** the data used to train the model.



Evasion Attacks

Attacker may **discover and exploit existing vulnerabilities** in the model in order to **manipulate** the decision.



Poisoning Attacks

Attacker may strategically **influence the training** of the model in order to **manipulate** the model decision.


Confidentiality Attacks

- **Model Extraction**

Attacks designed to extract the complete decision model. Successful attack gives the attacker the ability to predict all future decisions of the model and to replicate all the past decisions.

- **Data Extraction**


Attacks designed to extract the data points used to train the models. Data points may reveal information about business partners, customers, their transaction history and other data.



Confidentiality Attack

Supervised model is **trained**
on labeled samples

1




Confidentiality Attack

Model is **trained** on labeled samples


1

Decision boundary is **identified** during the training and defines the model

2




Confidentiality Attack



Confidentiality Attack

Model is **trained** on sample

Decision boundary identified during training and defines the



4

Attacker then uses standard training methods then **reproduce** the decision boundary and the whole model

3

Attacker can **strategically query** the model and obtain a dense set of his own training samples based on the interaction




Evasion

- **Existing model faults** can be exploited by adversaries to influence classification results:
 - Faults can be result of **insufficient training set** not covering relevant business-adverse cases
 - Feature selection can introduce model dependence on **proxy features** unrelated to the business performance

Evasion Attack

AI is used to scale out
and **automate**
business decisions

1




Evasion Attack


1 AI is used to scale out and **automate** business decisions

2 Models need to **generalise** and make decisions based on similar cases in the past, included in the training set

3 Most generalisation is good, when supported by **dense and representative** data in the feature space



Evasion Attack



Most generalisation is good, when supported by **dense and representative** data in the feature space

3

5

In evasion attacks, the attacker discovers a region of the feature space where **missing training data** for one decision allow the learning algorithm to attach the region to the adjacent region with the opposite

The vulnerabilities that cause evasion can also cause unfairness and **discrimination**

6

Some **generalisation** is **bad**, due to combination of suboptimal features and missing training set data

4

Poisoning


- Attacker **influences** the update process of the model in order to **introduce** exploitable vulnerability
- Inserted samples can be introduced during ordinary course of business by **strategic business interaction**
- Model becomes **biased** by the introduction of the poisoned training samples. Attacker can cause damage and benefit from biased model decisions



Poisoning Attack

1

Business changes
constantly and models
need to follow



Poisoning Attack

1


Business changes constantly and models need to follow the

2


During poisoning, the attackers actively **create** model **vulnerabilities** during the model update.

3

To achieve poisoning, the attacker must **influence the training data** set by inserting a set of (mis)labeled



Poisoning Attack




by inserting a set of (mis)labeled

5 Perfect loan payments on **small loans** in specific zipcode/

4 In practice, this is not too hard. Training data is most often **collected from the actual business.**

Poisoning Attack



3

To achieve poisoning, the attacker must **influence the training data** set by inserting a set of (mis)labeled

New model then reflects the biased samples inserted by the attacker and is open for exploitation by the attacker.

7

6

Reputation building on small transactions in e-commerce

5

Perfect loan payments on **small loans** in specific zipcode/

4

In practice, this is not too hard. Training data is most often **collected from the actual business.**

Artificial Intelligence is like an army of 5-year old kids.

(paraphrased from Alex Stamos)



Alex Stamos ✓
@alexstamos

Having access to the world's best machine learning is like having access to 10 billion five-year-olds.


If your task is "move that huge pile of bricks" then 10B kids are super helpful, but you can't ask them "build the Taj Mahal".



Alex Stamos ✓ @alexstamos · Apr 25
Replying to @alexstamos

So yes, now that humans are looking at an example of a harmful video, it is trivial to pick out ML strategies to detect it. Telling computers "find all videos where people are being hurt" against an infinite search space of possibilities is AGI-hard.

3 26 148




Alex Stamos ✓ @alexstamos · Apr 25

One of the problems here is that tech execs like to say "we will fix it with AI" while thinking "...in five years and \$1B" and the media hears "...next month" and the actual ML engineering director thinks:


Deep Networks and Details

- Deep learning methods exhibit strong preference for detail at the expense of high-level concept extraction



Deep Networks and Details


Horse-picture from Pascal VOC data set



Source tag present



Classified as horse



No source tag present




Not classified as horse

Artificial picture of a car




The curse of dimensionality

- With increasing dimension, properties of the space change dramatically:
- Euclidean distance no longer has much meaning
- We are **always** just a tiny step away from a mistake - in some dimension(s)



Amazon HR system



REUTERS BUSINESS NEWS
OCTOBER 9, 2018 / 11:12 PM / UPDATED 11 HOURS AGO

Amazon scraps secret AI recruiting tool that showed bias against women

SAN FRANCISCO (Reuters) - Amazon.com Inc's ([AMZN.O](#)) machine-learning specialists uncovered a big problem: their new recruiting engine did not like women.

- Text analysis: Huge number of features available to the system.
- Problem: System refuses to hire women candidates (based on the past decisions).
- Fix 1: Explicit sex/gender field removed.
- Fix 2: The system then started using his/hers salutations - clean-up.
- Fix 3: Sports, schools and other hard-to-remove features surfaced...
- Project canceled.



AI Disrupts Finance

- Immediate decisions, anytime
- Better decisions & pricing drive competition
- New markets
- **Immediate convenience**

Fraud Detection for Instant Credit

85% alert volume reduction for fraud team

50% of fraud incidents auto-prevented before approval

15% of previously “non-fraud defaults” identified as fraud

+ Better robustness against new attacks

+ Improved risk scoring thanks to cleaner data


LIST


BULLETPROOF.AI

 Zlata de Mikitinová


Status: ACCEPTED





 Ve Žlábkách 2168, 27601 Mělník, CZ


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 +420793098822






DEVICE DETAILS

 Order 2019-04-08T13:47:49

NAME	PRODUCT ID	QUANTITY	CATEGORY	PRICE	GAIN
 Motul 5100 4T 10W-40 4 l	af8d098931309...	1	2206	625,-	+ 500,-
 Pirelli P6 Cinturato 195/65 R15 91H	379cfd2765f3b...	1	972	1340,-	+1072,-
 Doprava DPD				0,-	
 Burner SIM card					- 100,-
\$ Total damage / gain:				1965,-	1472,-


 Zlata de MikitinováStatus: ACCEPTED Ve Žlábkách 2168, 27601 Mělník, CZ zlata.de.mikitinova.108@czechfraud.com +420793098822

DEVICE DETAILS

 None MacIntel 3840x2160 | 24bit | Intel(R) Iris(TM) Plus Graphics 655 Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/73.0.3683.86 Safari/537.36 cs-CZ 10.54.81.188 Order 2019-04-08T13:47:49

NAME	PRODUCT ID	QUANTITY	CATEGORY	PRICE	GAIN
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Bulletproof AI - Full Solution



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